# SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

# I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Date of Incident:	30 April 2018
Time of Incident:	15:30 Hours
Location of Incident:	
Date of COPA Notification:	30 April 2018
Time of COPA Notification:	17:50 Hours
without justification without with without	
Involved Officer #1:	, Star: Employee ID: ; DOA: 2011; Rank: Police Officer; UOA: ; DOB: 1982; Female; White
Involved Officer #2:	DOA: 2015; Rank: Police Officer; UOA: DOB: 2015; Gender: Female; Race: Hispanic
Involved Officer #3:	DOA: 2002; Rank: Sergeant; UOA: DOB: 1977; Gender: Male; Race: White
Involved Individual #1:	, DOB: 1984, Black Male

# III. ALLEGATIONS

Officer	Allegation	Finding /
		Recommendation
Officer	1. It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at	EXONERATED
	approximately 1547 hours, at	
	, Officer detained	
	without justification.	

	2.	It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1547 hours, at handcuffed without justification.	EXONERATED
	3.	It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1547 hours, at, Officer searched without justification.	UNFOUNDED
	4.	It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1547 hours, at graph of the vehicle of graph without justification.	SUSTAINED
Officer	1.	It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1547 hours, at detained without justification.	EXONERATED
	2.	It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1547 hours, at handcuffed without justification.	EXONERATED
	3.	It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1547 hours, at, Officer searched without justification 6.	EXONERATED
Sergeant	1.	It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1600 hours, at postrict Police Department, Sergeant refused to take a report or complaint from regarding his allegation of police misconduct by Officer and Officer regarding his allegation of police misconduct by Officer regarding his allegation hi	SUSTAINED
	2.	It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1600 hours, at provided property provided	NOT SUSTAINED

and profanity regarding his race.

#### IV. APPLICABLE RULES AND LAWS

#### Rules

- 1. Rule 1: Prohibits an officer from violating any law or ordinance.
- 2. Rule 2: Prohibits an officer from engaging in any action or conduct which impedes the Department's goals or brings discredit upon the Department.
- 3. Rule 6: Prohibits the disobedience of an order or directive, whether written or oral.
- 4. Rule 8: Prohibits the disrespect to maltreatment of any person, while on or off duty.

#### General Orders

General Order G08-01-02, Specific Responsibilities Regarding Allegations of Misconduct

Special Orders					
Special	Order	S04-13-09,	Investigatory	Stop	System
Federal Laws					
U.S. Constitution Amendment IV					

#### State Laws

- 1. 725 ILCS 5/107-14, Temporary Questioning Without Arrest
- 2. 725 ILCS 5/108-1.01, Search During Temporary Questioning


#### V. INVESTIGATION 1


#### a. Interviews

2 gave a statement to the Civilian Office of Police Accountability on May 1, 2018. Stated that on April 30, 2018, he was visiting his uncle, went outside to smoke a cigarette. After he finished his cigarette, he walked down the stairs to discard it outside of the fenced-in yard. Watched as the officers turned on to his block. As soon as the officers saw him, they turned on their sirens, pulled up next to him, got out of their vehicle, and began asking him questions and telling him to put his hands up. Officer told him that he matched the description of a suspect in the area.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> COPA conducted a thorough and complete investigation. The following is a summary of the material evidence gathered and relied upon in our analysis.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Summarized from the digitally recorded statement of Attachment 13





<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Summarized from the digitally recorded interview of Officer Attachment 27


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See Attachment 3.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Summarized from the digitally recorded interview of Sergeant Attachment 30


would not accept the complaint because the officers did not do anything wrong. However, Sergeant id tell that he could contact COPA if he wanted to press it further.
Sergeant denied telling and that was not racially profiled because is black and lives in and there is no one else there for police to "fuck with." According to Sergeant based on the investigatory stop report and attire, an all-black outfit with white letters or numbers, matched the description. Sergeant relayed the same to Sergeant told investigators that, based on his preliminary investigation into the matter, he did not believe there was basis for a complaint, so he did not accept it. Sergeant did admit, after further review and being interviewed regarding his failure to accept the complaint, that he should have filed the complaint regardless of whether he believed there was wrongdoing.
b. Digital Evidence
Officer Body Worn Camera <sup>7</sup> (BWC) showed Officer driving her vehicle to where she encountered an African American man wearing a black shirt with white lettering, a black scarf, a black "du rag," and light-colored blue jeans. The man, now known to be was standing on the curb a few feet away from a white midsized sedan. Officer exited the vehicle and immediately began placing the man's right hand behind his back, while a Caucasian female officer, now known to be Officer did the same to his left arm. Officer first patted the outside of the man's pockets. As she patted his left rear pocket, some unidentified object in his pocket created a visible straight-edged indentation. Officer then opened his pocket, put her hands into his pockets to investigate the object. She did not remove the object. She then continued patting the outside of his clothes. A second squad car appeared on the scene.
Officer then took the wallet out of his back pocket and retrieved his identification and went back into her vehicle. Officer and the license plate on the vehicle and confirmed that it belonged to the could be seen standing to the driver's side of the vehicle while Officer and his name. When Officer exited her vehicle, a different Caucasian female officer was holding and a Caucasian male officer stood nearby. Officer confronted with the fact that he was a licensed carry concealer and that it was different from him being busted for a gun.
asked if he was under arrest and demanded to be released if he was not under arrest. The male officer could be heard asking where he got his law degree. protested that the officers illegally searched his car without probable cause. Officer retorted that there was probable cause because they were all at the car and the other two men ran. Officer offered a stop receipt and he accepted. He read the stop receipt and said, "have a good day Officer According to Officer BWC, the detention lasted slightly longer than six minutes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See Attachment 34.




<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> See Attachment 34.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See Attachment 34.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> See Attachment 34.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Attachment 14 and Attachment 33



<sup>12</sup> Attachment 3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Attachment 22

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Attachment 19

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Attachment 8 <sup>16</sup> Attachment 35

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Attachment 36

In a <b>letter written by Mr.</b> In this letter, wrote about another interaction with the Chicago Police Department. In this letter, also wrote that at 3:30 PM on April 30 <sup>th</sup> , Officer star No. In this letter, also wrote that at as he left his house. According to the officers told him that he fit the description of a shooting suspect. It adamantly insisted that he had not been engaged in any crime. Officer placed him in handcuffs and then proceeded to search his vehicle, including the trunk.
wrote that he followed up the encounter by attempting to file a complaint with Sergeant in the District. According to Sergeant declined to take his complaint, telling him that it was not profiling because he is black and lives in there is no one else there for the police to "fuck with."
Neither Officer BWC <sup>19</sup> nor Officer BWC <sup>20</sup> captured any significant part of the incident.

### **LEGAL STANDARD**

For each Allegation COPA must make one of the following findings:

- 1. <u>Sustained</u> where it is determined the allegation is supported by a preponderance of the evidence;
- 2. <u>Not Sustained</u> where it is determined there is insufficient evidence to prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence;
- 3. <u>Unfounded</u> where it is determined by clear and convincing evidence that an allegation is false or not factual; or
- 4. <u>Exonerated</u> where it is determined by clear and convincing evidence that the conduct described in the allegation occurred, but it is lawful and proper.

A **preponderance of evidence** can be described as evidence indicating that it is **more likely than not** that the conduct occurred and violated Department policy. *See Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.*, 216 Ill. 2d 100, 191 (2005), (a proposition is proved by a preponderance of the evidence when it has found to be more probably true than not). If the evidence gathered in an investigation establishes that it is more likely that the misconduct occurred, even if by a narrow margin, then the preponderance of the evidence standard is met.

Clear and convincing evidence is a higher standard than a preponderance of the evidence but lower than the "beyond-a-reasonable doubt" standard required to convict a person of a criminal offense. See e.g.,  $People\ v.\ Coan$ , 2016 IL App (2d) 151036 (2016). Clear and Convincing can be defined as a "degree of proof, which, considering all the evidence in the case, produces the firm and abiding belief that it is highly probable that the proposition . . . is true." Id. at  $\P$  28.

<sup>19</sup> See Attachment 34.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Attachment 32

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> See Attachment 34.

#### VII. **ANALYSIS**

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution generally prohibits warrantless searches and seizures without probable cause.<sup>21</sup> This case implicates Mr. Fourth Amendment rights because the accused officers stopped him, handcuffed him, patted him down, and searched his vehicle without his consent.<sup>22</sup> The relevant case law, state statutes, and CPD directives set different rules for stops, pat-downs, and vehicle searches. When evaluating searches and seizures "an objective standard applies, so the police officer seeking to justify the intrusion 'must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."23 "Courts do not evaluate probable cause in hindsight, based on what a search does or does not turn up."24 "The facts . . . instead should be considered from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the time that the situation confronted him or her."<sup>25</sup>

# 1. Terry – or Investigatory – Stop

An officer may perform an investigatory stop "when the officer reasonably infers from the circumstances that the person is committing, is about to commit or has committed" a crime. <sup>26</sup> The Fourth Amendment, Supreme Court precedent<sup>27</sup>, Illinois law, <sup>28</sup> and Chicago Police Department Special Order S04-13-09(A), (B) permit an officer to conduct a warrantless search – often referred to as a pat down or frisk - of a person's outer clothing during an investigatory stop when the officer reasonably believe the person may be armed. Additionally, an officer may handcuff a person during an investigatory stop when the officer reasonably believes the suspect is armed or poses a danger to the officer or others.<sup>29</sup> To justify a *Terry* stop, "the situation confronting the police officer must be so far from the ordinary that any competent officer would be expected to act quickly." 30 A "reasonable suspicion" need not be enough to constitute probable cause, but must be more than a "mere hunch." In evaluating the propriety of a *Terry* stop, the facts are to be viewed from the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.15 (1968)("the Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security, and to make the scope of the particular intrusion, in light of all the exigencies of the case, a central element in the analysis of reasonableness.")

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Att. # 33, Investigatory Stop Receipt indicates Mr. did not give consent for the search of his vehicle. <sup>23</sup> *People v. Long*, 99 Ill. 2d 219, 227-28 (1983)(quoting *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 249 (2013) (citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> People v. Thomas, 198 III, 2d 103, 110 (2001)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> 725 ILCS 5/107-14(a); see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326-27 (2009)(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 88).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326-27 (2009) ("First, the investigatory stop must be lawful. That requirement is met in an on-the-street encounter . . . when the police officer reasonably suspects that the person apprehended is committing or has committed a criminal offense. Second, to proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police officer must reasonably suspect that the person stopped is armed and dangerous")(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 88).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> 725 ILCS 5/108-1.01

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> United States v. Wilson, 2 F.3d 226, 231 (7th Cir. 1993) (upholding use of handcuffs in investigatory stop); Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 957-958 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding use of handcuffs in investigatory stop); United States v. Glenna, 878 F.2d 967, 972 (7th Cir. 1989) (handcuffing was permissible as part of a Terry stop where police dispatch indicated defendants were in possession of several small weapons and an explosive device, and a loaded clip was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> People v. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d 103, 110 (2001)(citing People v. Long, 99 Ill. 2d at 228-29).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> *Id*.

perspective of a reasonable police officer under the same circumstances, and not "with analytical hindsight." <sup>32</sup>

### 2. Warrantless Searches beyond pat down

The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits an officer from performing a warrantless search beyond a protective pat down.<sup>33</sup> If a search during an investigative stop "goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under *Terry*."<sup>34</sup> Supreme Court case law<sup>35</sup> and the applicable CPD directive both limit a protective pat down to the "outer clothing" and note it is "not a general exploratory search for evidence of criminal activity."<sup>36</sup> If an officer has probable cause to arrest an individual, then an officer may conduct an extensive warrantless search of the individual's person to preserve evidence and to disarm the subject prior to "the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station."<sup>37</sup> Finally, if an individual "freely and voluntarily" consents to a search then it is constitutionally valid.<sup>38</sup>

#### 3. Automobile Exception – probable cause required

The Fourth Amendment permits an officer to search a vehicle when the officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.<sup>39</sup> Vehicles' "ready mobility" and "the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways" are the primary justifications for the automobile exception.<sup>40</sup> "A police officer has probable cause to conduct a search when the facts available to him would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime is present."<sup>41</sup> Courts look to the totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis to determine probable cause as it "is a fluid concept--turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts--not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."<sup>42</sup>

## Allegations against Officer

1. It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1547 hours, at Officer detained without justification in violation of rules 1 and 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> *Id*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993) (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968)).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)( "The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence . . . .")

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> CPD Special Order 04-13-09(II)(B).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (citing Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970), and Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Collins v. Virginia, \_\_\_U.S.\_\_\_, \_\_\_, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1669 (2018)(citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Collins v. Virginia, \_\_\_\_U.S.\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1669-70 (2018)(quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390, 932 (1985)).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2013)(internal citations omitted).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013)(citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).

Officer is **EXONERATED** of this allegation. The detention of was justified. Rule 1 prohibits an officer from violating any law or ordinance. The primary laws implicated are the Fourth Amendment and the Illinois law referenced above which codify an officer's abilities during an investigatory stop. Rule 6 prohibits an Officer from violating any directive or order. Special Order S04-13-09 outlines the policy for conducting an investigatory stop. An investigatory stop is defined as "the temporary detention and questioning of a person in the vicinity where the person was stopped based on Reasonable Articulable Suspicion that the person is committing, is about to commit, or has committed a criminal offense." The Special Order further explains, "[r]easonable Articulable Suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances which the sworn member observes and the reasonable inferences that are drawn based on the sworn member's training and experience." Here, we found that it was reasonable to detain investigatory stop. The evidence shows that near 1540 hours, OEMC received a call of shots fired in the and subsequently relayed the information to officers. In the message to officers, OEMC indicated that there were two black males heading from the scene through an alley towards OEMC indicated that one of the men was last seen wearing a black hoodie with words on it. Four minutes later, Officers and encountered a little more than one city block away from the scene. When Officers he was wearing a black sweatshirt with white lettering, a black encountered scarf, and blue jeans. As the officers approached, a black man, was standing in close proximity to a white sedan and two unidentified men were standing near the rear of the same vehicle. One of those men was also wearing a black hoodie or jacket. As the Officers approached, the two men near the rear of the vehicle walked away. Officer requested that a second squad car go after those two men, but they were never detained. Any of these factors alone would be an insufficient cause, but together make a compelling reason to at least investigate further. Both Officer and Officer indicated that they did not recall the detail that there had been more than one suspect, but instead had both keyed in on the description of the male wearing the black hoodie. Both officers expressed their belief that matched the description of the described suspect. 43 Both officers found proximity to the crime to be relevant to the likelihood he was the suspect. Both officers thought

2. It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1547 hours, at Officer handcuffed without justification in violation of rules 1 and 6.

acting nervously and saw the departure of the other two men as suspicious. Given the totality of the circumstances, it is reasonable that could be seen as a suspect as well. Accordingly,

behaving "suspiciously," albeit that description is subjective. The officers found that

the investigatory stop was appropriate and within policy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> "[S]imilarity in apparel, in addition to a description of the suspect's race and sex narrows considerably the population of potential suspects." *People v. Jones*, 102 Ill. App. 3d 246 (4th Dist. 1981)(citing *People v. Grice*, 87 Ill. App. 3d 718 (2nd Dist. 1980)).

This allegation is <b>EXONERATED.</b> Given the allegation that Officer	detention of
was found to be within policy, officers are permitted to handcuff an	individual during an
investigatory stop when they reasonably believe the suspect is armed or po	
officer or others. 44 Both officers articulated their fears that was the arm	ned shooting suspect
as the reason for handcuffing him. Both officers said that he matched the descr	ription of the suspect
and was found a block away from the scene of the shooting. Both officers sta	ated their belief that
he had a weapon on him.	

3. It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1547 hours, at Officer searched without justification in violation of rules 1 and 6.

This allegation is **UNFOUNDED.** Based on the statements of the officers involved and the corroborating video evidence, Officer did not conduct or participate in the search of Person.

4. It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1547 hours, at Officer searched the vehicle of without justification in violation of rules 1 and 6.

There are generally two exceptions to the warrant requirement for a vehicle search: consent and probable cause. COPA finds that neither exception is applicable here, and thus the allegation is **SUSTAINED**.

#### Consent

COPA finds that did not consent to the search of the vehicle. The voluntariness of consent to a police search depends upon the totality of the circumstances, and it is the State's to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the consent was voluntarily given. For the consent to be voluntary, "the consentor must have been under no duress or coercion, actual or implied, and the consent must have been unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently given."

Here, Officer belief that consented to the search of his vehicle is unreasonable. While not dispositive, the Investigatory Stop Receipt indicates that the search beyond pat down was done without consent.<sup>47</sup> At multiple times during the encounter,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> *United States v. Wilson*, 2 F.3d 226, 231 (7th Cir. 1993) (upholding use of handcuffs in investigatory stop); *Tom v. Voida*, 963 F.2d 952, 957-958 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding use of handcuffs in investigatory stop); *United States v. Glenna*, 878 F.2d 967, 972 (7th Cir. 1989) (handcuffing was permissible as part of a *Terry* stop where police dispatch indicated defendants were in possession of several small weapons and an explosive device, and a loaded magazine was found on a defendant).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> People v. Casazza, 144 Ill. 2d 414, 417 (1991).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> People v. Purchase, 214 III. App. 3d 152, 155 (3d Dist. 1991).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Att. 33.

challenged Officer authority to search the car and repeatedly complained that the search of the vehicle was illegal. That alone should be enough refute the contention that consent was voluntarily given, but the circumstances of the search make that even less likely. At the time of the search, as handcuffed and surrounded by officers. Moments prior to the search, he expressed being afraid to reach for his wallet to give the officers his identification. It telling Officer that the keys were in his uncle's house when they were actually in his car is further evidence that he did not want his car searched.<sup>48</sup>

#### **Probable Cause**

Absent consent, an officer must have probable cause to search a vehicle. Special Order S04-13-09 states that probable cause exists where the police have knowledge of facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that a crime has occurred and that the subject has committed it. Special Order S04-13-09 is consistent with Constitutional Law, which states, "[i]t is clearly established that the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches of automobiles unless there is probable cause to believe that contraband is located in the vehicle or that the car is an instrumentality of a crime.<sup>49</sup>" "A police officer has probable cause to conduct a search when the facts available to him would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime is present."<sup>50</sup> Courts look to the totality of the circumstances on a case-bycase basis to determine probable cause as it "is a fluid concept--turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts--not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."<sup>51</sup> Here, there was no probable cause to suspect the vehicle contained evidence of a crime or was involved in the crime.

took that to mean that had been arrested for illegally possessing a firearm, which made it more reasonable to believe that might be armed in this situation than it would have been absent that statement. Officer patted down and found no weapon, she then inquired about vehicle. In the Investigatory Stop Report, Officer wrote that in her experience as an officer, gang members often used vehicles to hide contraband. However, and the two other individuals' proximity to the vehicle is insufficient to provide probable cause for searching the interior of the vehicle and the trunk. Officer did did not observe any persons of interest accessing the vehicle or the trunk. The OEMC message reporting the shooting did not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> See People v. Sweborg, 293 Ill. App. 3d 298 (3d Dist. 1997)(Fact that suspect explained how to remove keys from ignition when the officer had trouble was not consent for search of trunk when subject repeatedly said he did not want his personal items searched.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Walker v. Guzik, Civil Action No. 87-2702, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2497, at \*20 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 1991

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2013)(internal citations omitted).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013)(citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> "Information that the defendant committed a similar offense is relevant to probable cause." *Porter v. City of Chicago*, 393 Ill. App. 3d 855, 868, 912 N.E.2d 1262, 1273 (1st Dist. 2009)(citing *People v. Hendricks*, 253 Ill. App. 3d 79, 88-89 (1st Dist. 1993))

include any vehicle descriptions, or even that a vehicle was used in the crime. Similarly, the description: African American male wearing a black shirt with unspecified white lettering — was not specific enough to give Officer probable cause to perform more than a <i>Terry</i> stop of Mr. which does not extend to a search of a vehicle and the trunk. In short, there was no evidence that Mr. as involved in the shooting, or that the two men who walked away had access to the car, or that the vehicle was involved in the shooting, and thus there was no probable cause to search the vehicle for evidence of a crime.
For these reasons, the allegation that Officer searched vehicle without justification is <b>SUSTAINED</b> .
Allegations against Officer
1. It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1547 hours, at Officer detained without justification in violation of rules 1 and 6.
This allegation is <b>EXONERATED.</b> Officer was justified in detaining the same rationale applies.
2. It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1547 hours, at Officer handcuffed without justification in violation of rules 1 and 6.
This allegation is <b>EXONERATED.</b> Officer was justified in handcuffing See the analysis for allegation 2 against Officer The same rationale applies.
3. It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1547 hours, at Officer searched without justification in violation of rules 1 and 6.
Officer is <b>EXONERATED</b> of this allegation. Rule 1 prohibits an officer from violating any law or ordinance. The primary laws implicated are the Fourth Amendment and the Illinois laws referenced above which codify an officer's rights during an investigatory stop. Rule 6 prohibits an Officer from violating any directive or order. Special Order S04-13-09 says:
"When an officer has detained a subject based upon Reasonable Articulable Suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and, during that detention, develops additional Reasonable Articulable Suspicion that the subject is armed and dangerous or reasonably suspects that the person presents a danger of attack to the officer or another, the officer may conduct a Protective Pat Down of the outer clothing of the subject for hard objects that could be used as weapons."
Officer stopped on because he matched the description of a black male in a black sweatshirt headed toward who fired shots approximately one block away.

received. The nature of the crime for which was stopped was such that would reasonably lead an officer to believe he was armed and dangerous.
Officer safety protocols require to be patted down outside of his clothing for hard objects and would permit a more thorough investigation of hard objects. During the course of Officer pat down of the outline of a hard object became visible through back pocket. Officer conducted a more thorough investigation of the object by peering into the pockets and placing her hand inside. We find that this search was not excessive in scope. For the reasons discussed above, Officer is <b>EXONERATED</b> of this allegation.
Allegations against Sergeant
1. It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1600 hours, at District Police Department, Sergeant refused to take a report or complaint from regarding his allegation of police misconduct by Officer and Officer in violation of rule 6.
This allegation is <b>SUSTAINED</b> . Rule 6 prohibits disobeying any order or directive, whether written or oral. General Order G08-01-02 requires that when incidents regarding allegations of misconduct subject to the Log Number process are received, the supervisor or commanding officer who first receives information of the alleged misconduct will contact COPA by telephone and will record all information available at the time the allegation was received in a report to COPA. This procedure was not followed in this case.
Sergeant admitted in his interview to COPA that he did not follow this directive because he mistakenly believed that it was up to his discretion to send the complaint to COPA, though he has since learned that it was not up to his discretion. Sergeant performed a preliminary investigation of the complaint, reviewed the investigatory stop report, and asked questions about the nature of the complaint. Sergeant told investigators that he did inform of COPA and suggested that take his complaints there, though, Sergeant was still obligated to accept the complaint and forward it on to COPA anyway. Because Sergeant admission, there is no reason for further analysis.
2. It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1600 hours, at District Police Department, Sergeant verbally abused by using derogatory language and profanity regarding his race in violation of rules 2 and 8.
This allegation is <b>NOT SUSTAINED.</b> Rule 2 holds officers accountable for violations of policy and the Department's stated goals. Among those policies and goals is the obligation to police courteously and fairly to all citizens. Rule 8 prohibits an officer from engaging in disrespectful conduct or speech. Overall, COPA found both and Sergeant credible.  Was very candid and factually accurate in his description of events with Officer and Officer He was also candid about his interactions with Sergeant at least to the extent that many of his allegations were corroborated by Sergeant himself. Sergeant

was also very candid in recounting his interaction with and his rationale for making the decision that he did. Sergeant also accepted culpability for failing to accept complaint in violation of Department rules, but denied making the alleged profane and insulting comments. With two credible witnesses telling two very similar stories that turn on a single statement, COPA does not have sufficient evidence to determine by a preponderance of the evidence what occurred.

#### VI. RECOMMENDED DISCIPLINE FOR SUSTAINED ALLEGATIONS

# a. Officer

# i. Complimentary, Training and Disciplinary History

Officer complimentary and training history were considered in the recommended finding. Officer received a reprimand for current license plate/city sticker violation, January 2019.

### ii. Recommended Penalty, by Allegation

Officer was appointed October 17, 2011 and since has not had training on 4<sup>th</sup> Amendment Search and Seizure. COPA recommends a discipline of Violation-Noted and training on 4<sup>th</sup> Amendment Search and Seizure Training.

# b. Sergeant

### i. Complimentary and Disciplinary History

Sergeant training, complimentary and disciplinary history were considered in recommending discipline in this case. Sergeant does not have a history of discipline.

# ii. Recommended Penalty, by Allegation

Sergeant was forthcoming in taking responsibility for independently investigating complaint instead of filing a complaint with COPA, per policy and procedure. Despite his admission, the seriousness of impeding a complaint warrants a 5-day suspension.

### VII. CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis set forth above, COPA makes the following findings:

Officer	Allegation	Finding /
		Recommendation
Officer	1. It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at	EXONERATED
	approximately 1547 hours, at	

		Officer detained without justification.	
	2.	It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1547 hours, at Officer handcuffed without justification.	EXONERATED
	3.	It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1547 hours, at Officer searched without justification.	UNFOUNDED
		It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1547 hours, at Officer searched the vehicle of without justification.	SUSTAINED
Officer	1.	It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1547 hours, at Officer detained without justification.	EXONERATED
	2.	It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1547 hours, at Officer handcuffed without justification.	EXONERATED
	3.	It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1547 hours, at Officer searched without justification.	EXONERATED
Sergeant		It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1600 hours, at District Police Department, Sergeant refused to take a report or complaint from regarding his allegation of police misconduct by Officer and Officer	SUSTAINED
	2.	It is alleged that on 30 Apr 2018, at approximately 1600 hours, at District Police Department,	NOT SUSTAINED

# CIVILIAN OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY

# LOG#1089294

	by using derogatory language rofanity regarding his race.
Approved:	
	March 28, 2019
Deputy Chief Administrator – Chief Inves	Date

# Appendix A

Assigned Investigative Staff

Squad#:	
Investigator:	
Supervising Investigator:	
Deputy Chief Administrator:	